Power of Attorney  Conferring No Authority by Mechem, Floyd R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1925
"Power of Attorney" Conferring No Authority
Floyd R. Mechem
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Floyd R. Mechem, ""Power of Attorney" Conferring No Authority," 20 Illinois Law Review 64 (1925).
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
AGENCY-"POWER OF ATTORNEY" CONFERRING NO AUTHORITY.
-[Xew York] A point of some novelty, though not of great diffi-
culty, is presented in the late New York case of Davis v. Dunnet,'
decided by the Court of Appeals. It was an action to foreclose a
mortgage, purporting to have been executed by the defendant,
through her husband as her agent. Under the statute, authority by
writing was necessary. A writing was produced and relied upon,
which was in the following form:
"POWER OF ATTORNEY.
"Know all men by these presents, that Emma L. Dunnet, have
made, constituted and appointed, and by these presents do make, con-
stitute and appoint Robert H. Dunnet, her true and lawful attorney for
my and in my name, place and stead, giving and granting unto the said
attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act
and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about
the premises as fully to all intents and purposes, as she might or could
do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation,
hereby ratifying and confirming all that the said attorney or substitute
shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the
sixth day of June in the year one thousand nine hundred and twenty.
"Emma L. Dunnet."
It had apparently been produced by signing the common printed
blank for a power of attorney, after inserting a few pronouns, but
wholly omitting to insert any statement whatever as to the act which
the agent was to be authorized to do. It was held to be insufficient
to authorize the mortgage.
No other case just like this one has been observed. A power of
attorney authorizing the attorney to grant, sell, release and convey,
and upon such sales to make, seal, acknowledge and deliver deeds,
etc., but not stating what was so to be sold and conveyed, has been
held to sufficiently show that a conveyance of land was intended,
though none was named, and to authorize the sale of any which the
grantor then owned.2 A power of attorney to sell "my lot," but not
stating what lot or where, has been held insufficient, at least in the
absence of proof that the grantor had but one. 3 A power of attor-
ney "to act in all my business, in all concerns, as if I was present
myself, and to stand good in law, in all my land and other business,"
in a certain territory, was held not to authorize a sale of land and
the making of binding covenants. 4 A power of attorney with the
name of the attorney in blank has been held to be inoperative until
the blank has been filled by someone having the grantor's authority
1. (1925) 239 N. Y. 338 146 N. E. 620.
2. 3larr v. Given (1843) 23 Me. 55, 39 Am. Dec. 600.
3. Stafford v. Lick (1859), 13 Cal. 240.
4. Ashley v. Bird (1826) 1 Mo. 640, 14 Am. Dec. 313.
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to fill it.5 These are some illustrations of the cases which have dealt
with questions more or less analogous, but not identical. The con-
clusion reached in the principal case seems unquestionably sound.
FLOYD R. MECHEM.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA-W-ADMIRALTY-STATE STATUTE INEF-
FECTIVE TO CHANGE ADMIRALTY RULE OF NEGLIGENCE IN MAARITIME
ToRT.-[United States] Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl'
is the latest corollary of the view of admiralty law in the United
States expressed by the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen2 and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart.3 In the Jensen case
it was held that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act could
not govern a fatal injury to a stevedore employed by a Kentucky
steamship company in unloading one of its vessels in New York
harbor, the action being brought by a dependent of the stevedore
against the steamship company in the New York courts (four jus-
tices dissenting). In the Stewart case it was held, in a similar suit
by an employee against an employing vessel owner, that Congress
could not authorize maritime injuries within each state to be gov-
erned by the local workmen's compensation acts, because this was a
delegation of legislative power to the states which would result in a
non-uniformity of maritime rules in the various states which the
grant of maritime power to the United States was intended to pre-
vent. Four judges dissented again in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes, on the ground that the Constitution did not forbid Congress
to make different rules for different states upon maritime matters
as it might upon many others,4 and that the act of Congress could
and should be interpreted as adopting existing state compensation
acts only instead of including future acts as well, thus avoiding the
objection of delegation of powers.
A later congressional statute which sought to restrict the effect
of the Stewart case to the masters and crews of vessels was also held
void in Washington v. Dawson & Co.,- a case where the employer
was not a vessel-owner but a local corporation doing a stevedoring
business as an independent contractor for vessels inside the state,
and the employee was a stevedore. The objections to this were
strongly put by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion, in
the course of which he said :6
"A concern doing a general upholstering business in New York
directs one of its regular employees, resident there, to make repairs on a
vessel lying alongside a New York dock. The ship, then temporarily
out of commission, is owned and enrolled in New York and, when used,
5. United States v. Payette Lumber Co. (1912) 198 Fed. 881, aff. 208
Fed. 231, 125 C. C. A. 431.
1. (1925) 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157.
2. (1917) 244 U. S. 205.
3. (1920) 253 U. S. 149.
4. (1911) 219 U. S. 1, 9.
5. (1924) 264 U. S. 219.
6. 264 U. S. at 228-29, 231-32, 234-35.
